In re this post:

For Brad DeLong (who frankly should know better) and the other dipshits operating ShrillBlog: disagreeing with George W. Bush does not make one “shrill.” Going five years without criticizing someone in one’s own party, however, might well do so.

Brian Leiter posts an interesting email exchange between himself and philosopher Jerry Fodor.

Leiter asks “So what in the world is ‘analytic’ philosophy these days?” Fodor replies that analytic philosophers share a thesis, “semantic pragmatism,” and a methodological presumption, “semantic ascent.” Fodor claims to reject both the thesis and the methodological presumtion, and so by his own lights, is not an analytic philosopher!

Fodor may be right about analytic philosophers sharing this thesis and methodological presumption, but he is wrong to look at analytic philosophy as being defined by this thesis or presumption.

Analytic philosophy is best understood historically. Analytic philosophers are the intellectual descendants of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein (FRMW). They are those who work on the same set of problems as FRMW, or work on problems that arose while working on the first set of problems, or problems that arose while working on the second set of problems, and so on. They are those (such as Quine and Carnap) who read and drew inspiration from FRMW, or those (such as Davidson and Lewis) who read and drew inspiration from Quine and Carnap, or those who read and drew inspiration from Davidson and Lewis, and so on.

By this understanding, Fodor is certainly an analytic philosopher.

(þ Crooked Timber.)

Stuart Benjamin has the goods. Interestingly, Kull et al. omit one very plausible explanation why Kerry supporters are more “correct” than Bush supporters: Kerry simply, by sheer coincidence (or deliberate plotting—nobody fields am opinion poll in which they don’t have some expectation of the marginals), shares the perceived positions of the poll majorities, and there really isn’t much between-group variance on those points.

One might also point out that the question selection seems deliberately designed to elicit “known false” perceptions by Bush supporters and that some of the definitions—for example, “a major WMD program”—are in the eye of the beholder. Indeed, Iraq did have a major WMD program in the 1980s and 1990s, all credible intelligence information suggested that program continued underground in some capacity after UN inspectors left in 1998, there is at least some evidence that elements of that WMD program were transferred to Syria during the 2003 conflict, and it is crystal-clear that Saddam Hussein’s ambitions to have “a major WMD program” were just on hold until the Franco-Russian alliance was able to dismantle the remaining sanctions on Iraq.

Finally, it’s entirely possible the whole exercise captures non-attitudes galore. My 2004 MPSA paper suggests (admittedly, using a model that needs some additional work, once I learn how to do latent class analysis) that perceptions of threat from the Saddam Hussein regime were largely the product of partisan attitudes, rather than having an independent origin.

Pieter Dorsman returns to the theme of US-Canadian relations and counterterrorism, and—as always—makes some very good points worth reading.

Dan Drezner and that terrorist group that keeps beheading people in Iraq have both come out for John Kerry. Meanwhile, Scipio voted for “moonbat lunatic” Michael Badnarik.

Eric Muller is speechless. I think it could be worse: “One Nation Not Under The U.N.”

Incidentally, photoshops welcome...

Taegan Goddard wonders if voters are stupid; Andrew Cline replies:

I do not believe that citizens are lazy or stupid. The problems of the electorate are multiple and complex. But let me suggest one possibility among many why Americans appear to know so little about their own government and fail to participate in its running: We are fat and happy.

There are a number of different perspectives on the importance of political knowledge; in particular, the “rational public” perspective of Samuel Popkin and the “affective intelligence” perspective advanced by a number of scholars suggest that political knowledge is relatively unimportant, although there are many scholars who challenge both theses. That said, I reach a roughly similar conclusion to Andrew’s on the last page of my dissertation:

[T]he desirability of a society in which political issues are so critically important that they require the attentiveness of large segments of the public seems relatively low; consider highly polarized societies like contemporary Israel and Venezuela, where it is unlikely there are any voters without opinions on the Palestinian peace process or on the soft-authoritarian Chávez regime, respectively, where the outcome of elections is literally a question of life or death in many voters’ minds. Perhaps we should count our blessings that the most salient mainstream debates in the United States today are over the future of entitlement programs for the elderly, the level of restriction that will be placed on abortion, and where and under what conditions same-sex relationships will be acknowledged by the government—and that our pluralist system permits voters to focus their interests on particular policies that directly interest them. This suggests that rather than creating institutions that might lead to a more conflicted or polarized society, the interest of democracy would be best served by giving citizens the tools to participate in public debate, but leaving it up to them whether their participation is strictly necessary. (132)

This also is another excellent opportunity to pimp the Signifying Nothing book of the month.

Today’s Clarion-Ledger drops some quotes from Republican ex-presidents on us compiled by Richard W. Dortch. Identifying the glaring problem with his article is left as an exercise for the reader.

If you dropped by in the past 30 minutes or so, you may have noticed a brief flashback to July. I just brought back up the old box that the blog was hosted on, and it decided to take over the IP address for the blog. Things should be back to (near) normal now…

Messrs. Baude and Dilts seem to have the better of their argument with Josh Chafetz over whether or not voting for non-viable candidates in plurality elections is, in fact, voting; that behavior may not be rational qua Downs, but it is nonetheless casting a vote—albeit, perhaps, not a decisive one in the two-party contest. I also tend to think that expressive ballots may, nonetheless, have instrumental effects; one suspects Bill Clinton and Congress might have cared quite a bit less about balancing the budget in the mid-90s had not Ross Perot received approximately 20% of the vote in the 1992 presidential election.

And, for those who are missing it, there’s a lively debate over same-sex marriage going on in comments below.