Tuesday, 23 November 2004

The weak dollar

I’ve been reading about the weak dollar for more than two years and yet we have somehow managed to avoid economic armageddon. In fact, what’s concerned me more is the weird insistence on the part of China to peg their currency to ours at a very low value. Over the short term it hurts us by making China’s imports cheap and destroying jobs. Over the long term it causes China to destabilize their banking system by trying to maintain the peg against the dollar as it drops.

As I understand it (monetary theory is not my bag, man) the process involves printing additional yuan (or renmimbi) and simultaneously issuing new debt to soak up the new currency. I’ve heard these referred to as “wash transactions” or something similar. The additional debt that China must issue becomes untenable and destabilizes their banking system. Asset prices collapse, bank failures abound (because many debts are tied to asset prices) and the country enters a deflationary spiral, not unlike Japan in the 1980s. A spiral they have yet to recover from fully.

China raised interest rates for the first time since 1995 or 1996 a few weeks ago, so I was still under the impression that we were seeing 1980s Japan play itself out, only this time with China. Now, though, Robert Samuelson (and many, many others) is harping on it and I generally trust his judgment:

First, the American economy has grown faster than other advanced economies. Since 1990 U.S. economic growth has averaged 3 percent annually, compared with 2 percent for the European Union and 1.7 percent for Japan. America’s higher growth sucks in imports; Europe’s and Japan’s slower growth hurts U.S. exports.

Second, the global demand for dollars props up its exchange rate, making U.S. exports more expensive and U.S. imports cheaper. Indeed, many countries, particularly in Asia, fix their currencies to keep their exports competitive in the U.S. market. Instead of allowing surplus dollars to be sold on foreign exchange markets—lowering the dollar’s value—government central banks in Japan, China and other Asian countries have purchased more than $1 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities. Private investors have also bought lots of U.S. stocks and bonds. All told, foreigners own about 13 percent of U.S. stocks, 24 percent of corporate bonds and 43 percent of U.S. Treasury securities.

Up to a point, this arrangement benefits everyone. The world gets needed dollars; Americans get more imports, from cars to clothes. But we may now have passed that point. Hazards may outweigh benefits. The world may be receiving more dollars than it wants. A sell-off could spill over into the stock and bond markets and cause a deep global recession. Here’s how.

Samuelson’s is only one scenario (click through to read it) and I am convinced that there are so many variables at play that no one can know for sure what will really happen. Even so, it’s worth considering. I wish China would break that damned peg in any case. They would benefit, as would we. Update: The Economist's Buttonwood column has a good explanation of why this is such a big issue. They don't address the downside for Asia, though, as I would expect. They pretty explicitly expect the dollar to lose its status as the world's reserve currency. That would be shocking, to say the least. The euro has been well managed since its inception -- very little inflation -- but it seems unlikely that the financial markets would turn to the currency of a declining power.

2 comments:

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Cool, now that SN has its own resident economist, I don’t have to bug Alex and Tyler with my economics questions anymore.

Question: with the collapse of the dollar with respect to the Euro and the Yen, should I be seeing a corresponding rise in the dollar value of the international portion of my portfolio? (An EAFE index fund.)

If so, why haven’t I seen it so far? It’s been doing well, but no more so than my domestic Wilshire 4500 investments.

If not, why not, given that the stocks which make up the EAFE index are traded mostly in Euros and Yen?

 
Cool, now that SN has its own resident economist, I don’t have to bug Alex and Tyler with my economics questions anymore.

Brock,

I’m not an adequate substitute for either of those guys. The word student is the operative word in my bio. I tend to confine my observations to what I’ve seen, and the post on China is in that mold.

Having said that, there are several answers to your question and it depends on what currency you’re trading in. Is your international fund trading in dollars or in euros and yen? If you had bought yen and euros two years ago and were converting back to dollars to calculate your return, my guess is you would be seeing abnormal (good) returns. If, however, your funds are denominated in dollars you don’t benefit directly from the drop in the dollar.

The rest of the world (China excepted) is growing poorly, as Samuelson notes above, and I wouldn’t expect any abnormal returns due to their growth. You would see strong returns due to currency gains if you were holding euros and yen from two years ago. To the extent that your returns are driven by internal growth, and not currency gains, you would see weaker returns (this also depends on the fund managers and their choices, though you did say they were index funds).

Does that help at all?

 
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