One of the more reasoned (and reasonable) arguments against a war in Iraq is that Iraq can be effectively contained. In the short term, containment is a viable option; however, beyond the short term, containment solves relatively few problems:

• Effective containment requires the inspection process to continue. Without the imminent threat of U.S. and allied military action, the Iraqi regime is unlikely to continue to cooperate (and I use that term loosely) with inspectors.

• Effective containment requires a long-term U.S. commitment to maintain an imminent threat of military action. The U.S. cannot afford to station a large permanent force in the region for years, perhaps decades. “Friendly” states like Saudi Arabia cannot host a large permanent force for domestic political reasons, at least under their current regimes.

• Effective containment requires the sanctions regime to remain in place. France, China, and Russia are on record as wanting to loosen the sanctions or eliminate the sanctions regime altogether.

• Effective containment does nothing to hasten the end of the Iraqi regime. Twelve years of sanctions, enforced about as well as one can reasonably expect, have given Saddam Hussein a pretext to impoverish and starve the Iraqi people but otherwise have had little impact on his ability to enrich himself or consolidate his hold on power.

The only realistic long-term alternative to war in Iraq, or regime change accomplished by some other (unspecified) means, is a complete dismantling of the sanctions regime and an end to any pretense of containment. So, the big question is: in 2020, do we want a different regime in Iraq, or do we want Saddam or Uday still running the show with a rebuilt military and large quantities of WMD at their disposal?

E. Nough has some additional thoughts on Iraqi exceptionalism (or, why we're not planning invasions of Venezuela and Zimbabwe). Meanwhile, here's one for the “those who don't learn history” file. Neville Chamberlain would be proud.

At least, that's the emerging consensus among the free people of this planet about what will be on the UNSC's epitath if it fails to authorize military force against Iraq. Consider:

• Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries, 21 November 2002: “We support the goal of the international community for full disarmament of Iraq as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1441. In the event of non-compliance with the terms of this resolution, we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.”

• George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 28 January 2003: “[L]et there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”

• Statement of the “Gang of 8”, 30 January 2003: “The U.N. Charter charges the Security Council with the task of preserving international peace and security. To do so, the Security Council must maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its resolutions. We cannot allow a dictator to systematically violate those resolutions. If they are not complied with, the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result.”

• Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries, 5 February 2003: “The clear and present danger posed by the Saddam Hussein's regime requires a united response from the community of democracies. We call upon the U.N. Security Council to take the necessary and appropriate action in response to Iraq's continuing threat to international peace and security.”

• Fred Kaplan, Slate: “[I]f the Security Council does not now take action against Iraq, it might as well disband.”

• Eugene Volokh: “If the Security Council members took the view that the evidence is not damning, and that Iraq is cooperating, they would be (as best I can tell) completely wrong and irresponsible; but at least then if they persuaded the public of these facts, the recommended consequences would make sense. But if they acknowledge that there should be no meaningful consequences for gross violations of the Security Council's resolutions — then what's the point of having the Security Council?”

OK, that's what a goodly percentage of the world's democracies think. Well, the ones that aren't called France, at least. Now, let's review what the French want to do again:

Let us double, let us triple the number of inspectors. Let us open more regional offices. Let us go further than this, could we not, for example, put up, set up, a specialized body to keep under surveillance the sites and areas that have already been inspected? Let us very significantly reinforce the capacity for monitoring and collecting information in Iraq.

Wow. Saddam must be quaking in his boots. Defy the Security Council for a dozen years, and we'll sick more UN bureaucrats on your country! This may work in the European Union, where quel dommage! a farmer might have to face down an evil minion from Brussels if he's exceeded his milk quota, but outside the fantasy universe of Eurocrats (and the EU), nobody gives a damn. This isn't just more lard for the butter mountain, this is international peace and security we're talking about here.

The truly sad thing (well, at least if you're a Gaullist) is that the U.N. Security Council is about the last place on earth they have even the illusion of real political power. The Franco-German partnership in Europe is starting to look more like the German partnership with Vichy France. French military power is no match for a few malcontents on the streets of Abidjan. And French diplomacy was just emasculated by two editors at the Wall Street Journal's European edition.

Without the Security Council, and the ability to veto legislation there, France's relevance to the world order is rien. Last month, they handed the keys to Europe to the hollowed out regime of Gerhard Schröder. This month, they handed over all of their credibility to Saddam Hussein's. And, before the year is done, neither will remain in power and France is going to have a hard time getting Europe's keys back from the Christian Democrats and its credibility back from the interim civilian government of Iraq.

OxBlog's David Adesnik has a lengthy post that explores what public opinion polling means — both in general and in terms of the coming war with Iraq. My guess: the numbers are going to go much higher in the next few days, partly because of questions that better reflect reality and partly because the debate isn't about “unilateralism” versus “multilateralism” any more. Serious evidence is now on the table that the so-called “multilateral” approach doesn't work, and won't work. David concludes:

Saddam, if you are reading this, I advise you to disarm very, very soon.

At this point, I don't even think disarming would save him.

I could sit here and blather on about how the considerations being evoked by various frames and primes are changing (in part because the political environment has shifted), but (a) few people other than David would understand it and (b) I feel like I'm about ten minutes away from losing consciousness.

Kathy Kinsey has links to transcripts of Powell's presentation before the UNSC. I only got the audio version, and started partway in (due to having a late breakfast at McDonald's), but what I heard was pretty convincing — and, to echo what Stephen Green says, much more than I expected.

As for the French: either they are “slowly retreating,” as Irving Kristol put it on Fox News, or they're burying themselves in a deeper hole — as Tacitus says, de Villepin's prepared statement favoring “tripling” the number of inspectors was refuted before it was even given.

Having said that, I don't think it swayed many minds among the hardcore anti-war group. However, I suspect it will make a difference among the undecided part of the electorate here and in Europe — Powell's discussion Saddam Hussein's links to terror groups like Al Qaeda were clearly not (mostly) aimed at his immediate audience. More than anything else, American and European voters are looking for a clear, convincing case against Saddam Hussein and for war — and I think Powell made it very effectively.

Michele has a very apt analogy for the situation the French are in; it's in the realm of “too little, too late.” Chuck Simmins has some reaction, while VodkaPundit Stephen Green has a letter to anti-war protesters — albeit one I'll be very surprised if they read. As he puts it:

"Nothing new..." "I'm not convinced..." "Powell's heart isn't really in it..."

These familiar refrains, plus, as the ads say, many, many more are all over the no-war side of the blogosphere today.

For you idiots -- and I won't supply any links because I like some of you idiots -- no amount of proof is compelling, the bar can never be set too high, and no amount of reason can ever convince.

<Teal'c Voice>Indeed.</Teal'c Voice>

Steven Den Beste reacts, suggesting that Powell's use of Republican Guard communications may have been also intended as psyops against the Iraqi regime.

VodkaPundit and Dean Esmay reminded me that Conrad's dug up some interesting German links to Iraq's WMD programs in the Asia Times. If verified, this would be very disturbing news... and probably the end of Gerhard Schröder's rule in Germany.

James Lileks' genius is on full display. Today's Bleat is a must-read; he dissects a local Green councilwoman's response to the State of the Union address. My burst-out-laughing paragraph (from James):

Ah yes. Selected, not elected. It rhymes, so it must be true. I’ll still take him over Clinton, whose impeachment trials could be described as ERECTED, NOT EJECTED. But tarry if you will over that line: Perhaps it is unfair to expect George W. Bush to understand democracy. The Greens have entered the territory previously occupied by the right-wing fringe who thought Clinton would use Y2K to suspend the Constitution and use FEMA to institute martial law.

Oh yeah, it's also all about the oiiiiil. But you knew that already.

Incidentally, I'm surprised nobody ever comes up with something original — like we're trying to repeat the invasion of Japan so we can introduce baseball in Iraq to help out W's old friend Bud Selig. I mean, don't we all know that Harry Truman really nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki so we'd eventually enjoy the baseball prowess of Hideki Irabu and Ichiro Suzuki? Just think of all the olympic-calibre athletes we could recruit...

Found via VodkaPundit.

Andrea Harris comments (with a new skin!).

N.Z. Bear (pro-war) and Stand Down (pro-peace) are coordinating a debate on the possibility of war with Iraq. I may or may not actually participate (it depends, at some level, on how silly the anti-war side's questions seem to be), but if you have a question or two you'd like to see the other side answer, nominate it at the appropriate blog — N.Z. Bear is coordinating the pro-war side (so submit questions for the anti-war folks there), and Stand Down is doing likewise for the pro-peace contingent (vice-versa).

Hopefully the exercise will be enlightening for all concerned.

Amygdala has some thoughtful comments on the prospect of war today, well worth a read.

Perhaps it's fitting that Sunday was Groundhog Day; as Daniel Drezner points out, “it's déjà vu all over again” when it comes to Iraq:

The current cycle of opinion seems like a replay of September/October all over again -- publics/pundits feeling queasy about aggressive action, antiwar activists decrying U.S. imperialism, European leaders either categorically rejecting the U.S. position or calling for more time for "the process" to sort itself out, Russia constantly hemming and hawing, China shrugging its shoulders, and Iraq flipping the bird to anyone and everyone.

Then -- presto! -- Bush makes a compelling speech that points out the implications for the security of the U.S. and the prestige of the U.N. if no action is taken.

It's now clear President Bush was wrong when he said that “this looks like a re-run of a bad movie”; Groundhog Day was a pretty good one...

Somewhat lost in the shuffle today has been the Wall Street Journal's editorial and comments on how the so-called “Gang of 8” letter came about. Money quote from the editorial:

The notion that France and Germany speak for all of Europe is especially absurd, akin to assuming that New York City and Washington, D.C., speak for all of America. Down in the polls, German leader Gerhard Schröder barely speaks for a majority in his own country. The fact that France's Jacques Chirac threw him some anti-American political cover is news, but still a dog-bites-man story of Gallic hauteur. The vote in NATO on helping the U.S. in Iraq was after all 15–4 in favor, with the other opponents being the global powers of Belgium and Luxembourg.

The commentary by Michael Gonzalez, who along with Terri Raphael, solicited the letter, meanwhile contains this choice statement:

The Journal is an independent newspaper and doesn't carry water for any government.

Unlike certain other New York-based newspapers we could mention.

I heartily recommend reading Oliver Willis's latest on the coming conflict with Iraq; while I disagree about the motivations behind our Iraq policy (it would certainly be easier for us to co-opt Hussein than topple him, if expansionism was our goal), and perhaps even on the degree of politicization of 9-11 (though admittedly a game both major parties have engaged in; such is life in the current era), his conclusion is right on the money:

In the 21st century, we must end the cycle of supporting the lesser of two evils because it is expedient. Our culture grows in depth and understanding every nanosecond, yet our handling of the world and our place in it seems more regressive each passing day. America leads in ideas, and the willingness to implement them. We must not allow simple answers and blind aggression to retard the moral and spiritual growth of a nation. If our leaders always took the easy way out, the brute and the oaf’s path, we would not be the America we are today or the one we can look forward to tomorrow. To demand better of the world, the United States must take its role as leader and create an order that doesn’t oppress and subjugate (either directly or by proxy), but uplifts and educates from the poorest of the poor all the way up to the gilded gates of the elite.

These ideals, these concepts, these beliefs – are what this country stands for. Terror and fear will win when we allow the foundations of freedom to crumble.

To borrow the argument of OxBlog's David Adesnik, the business of American foreign policy should be to promote our core values of liberal democracy and the rule of law in the world; not so much to remake the world in our image as it is to ensure that free people everywhere can remake their societies in theirs. In other words, continuing the foreign policy that created modern Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan — while simultaneously rejecting the expediency of propping up the Mubaraks, Mussharafs, and Sauds of the world.

The more I think about Oliver's piece, though, the more I wonder about his “expansionism” theory for the conflict. Unlike in Afghanistan, there's no existing, credible government or military force (other than the Ba'ath Party itself, which has largely become Saddam's personality cult) that can enforce a post-Saddam order, so there has to be some “occupation force,” for a lack of a better term, to disarm the Ba'athist regime, train a new civilian police force and restructure the armed forces, and there has to be a management structure over the country's oil industry (presumably leading to eventual privatization). Obviously at some point both tasks can be handed off to the U.N. and other military forces, but for a year or so it's hard to imagine a stable Iraq without an occupation of some form.

Sean-Paul Kelley likes being called a flaming jackass (even in the transitive sense); I suppose that's his right. I don't know where he's seeing this “celebration among many bloggers about war” that he claims to observe in the comments on Pdawwg. My guess: he expects people who support war to be “bloodthirsty chicken hawks,” so in his mind he projects this onto others. Again, as I said before, it's a mark of unjustified smug moral superiority, or more succinctly the attitude that “I'm better than you.”

On the other hand, Alex Knapp has his head on straight, with the takedown I'd have posted yesterday if I had been (a) entirely conscious and (b) a better writer.

Steven Den Beste has some comments as well, as do Eric E. Coe and Robin Goodfellow.

Also see this post.

Glenn Reynolds links to Rand Simberg's inspired glossary for decoding various languages, including the variant of English used on the New York Times op-ed page and in translations of speeches by Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder. For example:

"let the inspections continue":

Allow more time for a few dozen people to literally cluelessly wander around a country hundreds of thousands of square miles in area, searching for things that the Iraqi government has no intention of letting them find, and are hidden in private homes, or mosques, or presidential "palaces" (some of which are themselves the size of typical western cities), or in caves that we don't even know exist, or that are moved just prior to the threat of an actual search in any of these areas, in order to continue to delay military action, in the slim hope that some other means of delay can be found while this one continues or that the weather will get too hot, or that W will forget why he's doing this, in order to put off forever the day that we actually remove Saddam Hussein from power.

As a dry run, you can try it out with this article; it'll make it much more coherent.

Sean-Paul Kelley is being a flaming jackass:

What I do want to say is that all of you warbloggers out there are [expletive] pathetic. Young American men and women are going to die very soon. And like the poem I quoted in the previous post you are all "smug-faced crowds with kindling eye/Who cheer when soldier lads march by" and you [expletive] better "sneak home and pray you'll never know/The hell where youth and laughter go."

Frankly, I'm not even sure why I'm linking to his offensive rhetoric; it certainly doesn't deserve any publicity. But here's my response.

The use of military force to achieve political goals is rarely justifiable. This, however, is one of those circumstances: it is abundantly clear that the government of Iraq, and in particular its leader Saddam Hussein, have no intention of complying with the express will of the international community, as articulated unanimously in UNSC Resolution 1441. Hussein has for twelve years defied numerous binding UNSC resolutions, violated the cease-fire agreement that concluded the first Gulf War, and engaged in mass murder of his own people. There is considerable evidence that his regime has harbored terrorists in its territory and aided and abetted terrorists in other states. These incontrovertible facts justify the intervention of the United States and other countries, as specifically authorized by UNSC Resolution 1441, to enforce the will of the Security Council and international community through military action.

It is likely that many Americans, Australians, Britons and others will die as a result of this action. Depending on how loyal Iraq's military is to Saddam Hussein, it is possible that many Iraqi civilians and soldiers will die as well. It is entirely possible that Iraq will also attack uninvolved parties, leading to the deaths of Israelis (Arabs and Jews). People die in wars; the best we can hope for is that our leaders will minimize the number of casualties on all sides by neutralizing Iraq's ability to kill our forces, its own people, and those of its neighbors.

I do not relish war. Twelve years ago I watched Americans go to war with Iraq from the military base in Britain where my father was stationed. Before I was born my father helped fight in Southeast Asia as a navigator on AC-130 gunships. Many of my parents' friends similarly served to defend our country, and some of those friends have made the ultimate sacrifice, whether in training or in battle; some of those friends' names appear on the Vietnam Memorial. My grandfather's brother was imprisoned as a POW for several years by the Chinese during the Korean War; he simply disappeared soon after his return after Korea, and we never heard from him again. People I know and respect are almost certainly on the front lines of this war.

Make no mistake. War is no videogame; on this we agree. But it is a slander of the worst order to assume that Andrew Sullivan and other so-called “chicken hawks” do not appreciate the sacrifices of our troops, or the reality of war. There is a right way to support our armed forces — the words of Jay Reding, who Sean-Paul links to, spring to mind — but to insult those who don't make a public display of soul-searching on the war is offensive and reeks of unjustified smug moral superiority.

As you've probably read by now, ex-political prisoner and former South African president Nelson Mandela has started sounding a bit more like current South African president Thabo Mbeki (and former congresswoman Cynthia McKinney):

Former South African President Nelson Mandela, who Bush has praised as a hero of human rights, joined the chorus of critics by calling Bush arrogant and implying the president was racist for threatening to bypass the United Nations and attack Iraq.

"Is it because the secretary-general of the United Nations is now a black man? They never did that when secretary-generals were white," Mandela said.

He also repeats the Chomsky-ite critique of U.S. actions in Iraq:

A Nobel Peace Prize winner, Mandela has repeatedly condemned U.S. behavior toward Iraq in recent months and demanded Bush respect the authority of the United Nations. His comments Thursday, though, were far more critical and his attack on Bush far more personal than in the past.

"Why is the United States behaving so arrogantly?" he asked. "All that (Bush) wants is Iraqi oil," he said.

The blogospheric reaction hasn't been all that positive. Jessie Rosenberg came out of reclusion to state:

Most pronouncements of racism I can at least understand, though usually not accept. This, though, makes very little sense to me. Why did Mandela choose to call Bush racist, instead of one of the many other possible pejoratives which would be at least a bit more relevant to the topic of discussion? I don't agree with most of the criticisms of Bush concerning Iraq, but if people are going to criticize him, I'd think they'd at least choose a criticism about Iraq.

Of course, as the saying goes, if you only have a hammer everything looks like a nail. Meanwhile, OxBlog's David Adesnik suggests that “the real reason is that the US no longer trusts any nation or organization headed by a Nobel Peace Prize winner.” Heck, we don't even trust our own ex-presidents who are Nobel Peace Prize winners, or even past secretaries of state, so it's hardly surprising we wouldn't trust anybody else who received that honor.

Emily Jones, on the other hand, is more concerned with taking down Mandela's reputation as a pacifist:

And speaking of the unspeakable, I wonder if Mr. Mandela cares to share his thoughts with us on "necklacing"? Or maybe explain what "One Settler, One Bullet" is supposed to mean? I guess the whole "Kill a Boer, kill a Farmer" was just one huge, misunderstood joke?

I'm not sure how much of the terroristic activity Mandela was really involved with — he was in prison, after all, for most of it — but it doesn't seem particularly germane to his point, which basically seems to be “unilateralism bad, multilateralism good” coupled with the bizarre viewpoint that the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council is securable through anything other than good old-fashioned realpolitik, coming from the same addled parts of the international community that think the International Court of Justice will be an impartial body and who put a great deal of stock in U.N. General Assembly resolutions. The fundamental bottom line is that the UNSC can lead (unlikely, given French and German rhetoric), follow (relatively likely), or get steamrolled (and join the Kellogg-Briand Pact and League of Nations in the dustbin of history), and the sooner Mandela, Chirac, and Schröder realize that the better off everyone will be.

From this week's Economist (subscription required):

Going to war this way is far from ideal. If war is necessary, it would be better under explicit UN authority, commanding the sort of legitimacy that only the Security Council can confer. That is why so many voices, not least American ones, are urging Mr Bush to try harder to talk his allies round, give the inspectors more time, or offer Iraq a “final, final” opportunity to disarm. And if it were indeed the case that extra time and effort, or offering Iraq yet another last chance, could produce consensus, Mr Bush would be wise to heed these voices. But it is probably not the case. For, at bottom, if the Security Council splits it will not be because of a lack of time or a failure of diplomacy. It will be because of a difference of opinion. America and Britain say that if Iraq under its present management got hold of a nuclear or biological bomb, this would be so dangerous that it would be worth going to war to prevent it. Many other governments demur. And it is hard to see how extra time will convert them.

... which dovetails nicely with The New Republic's, assailing the New York Times editorial page for “moving the goalposts” over the past four months:

[T]he supposition that any level of Iraqi defiance would spur the Security Council to authorize war is ahistorical. During the 1990s, our non-British allies compiled a record of consistent appeasement. After Iraq whittled away at the prerogatives of weapons inspectors, going so far as to deem areas as large as Washington "presidential palaces" and thus off-limits, China, France, and Russia refused to back even a toothless resolution admonishing Iraq for its lack of cooperation. After Iraq expelled the inspectors, France and Russia opposed pinprick bombing. If they considered bombing too strong a response to massive violations then, why would they support the vastly stronger alternative of full invasion in response to weaker violations now? It may be that our allies' reluctance to enforce Iraqi disarmament stems in part from their distaste for Bush and his cowboy style, disregard for environmental accords, and fondness for protectionism. But the lack of commitment to Iraqi disarmament on the part of France, Germany, and Russia long predates the Bush administration. And yet many American liberals prefer to reside in an alternate universe where the United Nations stands poised to defang Saddam if only the United States would be just a bit more reasonable.

There is one sentence in Tuesday's Times editorial that comes closest to expressing the true sentiments of antiwar liberals: "The world must be reassured that every possibility of a peaceful solution has been fully explored." Consider the implications: The character of the Iraqi crisis is such that there is always the possibility of a peaceful solution. At every point in time, Saddam permits the minimal level of inspections cooperation he can get away with. Whenever he is threatened, he backs down until the crisis subsides, only to ratchet up his defiance later. The only logical end to this cycle is Saddam's successful acquisition of a nuclear weapon, at which point disarmament, forcible or otherwise, will no longer be an option. Indeed, this would be the actual result of the policy favored by antiwar liberals--whether they consciously desire it or not.

Andrew Sullivan also takes down the Times editorial in question.

If eight European leaders issue a joint statement in support of the Iraqi war, would that constitute “news” in the New York Times? Apparently not.

So much for the Times being the “newspaper of record.”

Apparently Howell Raines finally figured out how to spin the news:

Assuming a somewhat frayed mantle as global diplomat, Prime Minister Tony Blair set off for the United States tonight to meet with President Bush, bearing an unusual pledge of support on Iraq from eight European leaders but leaving behind a continent ever more divided over the need for war.

Steven Den Beste thinks sending Colin Powell to the U.N. on February 5 is a climb-down, while VodkaPundit argues that this is more an ultimatum than a call for a second resolution.

My thought: we're going to the Security Council because UNSC Resolution 1441 calls for “consultation” (but not a second resolution) before Iraq gets its “serious consequences” (i.e. an invasion). Just as 1441 was Iraq's final chance to declare its weapons of mass destruction and delivery mechanisms (which it has clearly failed), February 5th is the Security Council's final chance to declare whether it is relevant to the international order — the General Assembly long ago abdicated any relevance on that point, so the UNSC is basically the only credible U.N. organ left. The Security Council has three basic options:

1. Rubber stamp the US/UK/Australian/Spanish/Italian/Turkish/Kuwaiti/Qatarian coalition in a second resolution. (Apologies if I left someone important out.)

2. Not pass a second resolution but concede the US position that one isn't necessary (through a procedural motion not subject to veto, or without a formal vote).

3. Actively oppose coalition action (i.e. via a French explicit, unilateral veto or through a threat to veto any second resolution — the UNSC equivalent to a Senate “hold”) and be ignored by the multilateral US-led coalition.

As an institutional decision (to reinforce the illusion of the UNSC as arbiter of all international disputes), option one makes the most sense, while as a political decision (to not undercut the UNSC while at the same time leaving France free to rhetorically oppose coalition action in Iraq), option two makes the most sense.

Option three is only a viable option if the French (not the British or the US) have decided that the UNSC, and by extension the UN system as a whole, is no longer an important venue for French political influence over international events. However, such a decision would severely undercut France's efforts to “punch above its weight class” in international affairs, would probably lead to the collapse of NATO and the fragmentation of the European Union, and might lead to active US and British efforts to curtail France's neo-imperialist foreign policy and military intervention in Africa, none of which (obviously) are in France's best interest.

So, the reason Colin Powell will be at the Security Council on the 5th is to pursue option two — Security Council acquiesence. If he gets a second resolution, he'll be happy. If he gets French stonewalling, it won't matter. It moves the timetable back to around February 8 (slightly more than a week from Den Beste's original prediction) for a start of hostilities.

The bigger question is why is President George W. Bush paying any attention to the Security Council? Obviously, the polls have something to do with it (although I'm not convinced that they have much meaning on this issue — when war comes, Bush will get overwhelming support even if every single ally isn't involved). I also think that Bush isn't a unilateralist. This may be surprising to the Europeans in the audience, and the anti-war left, but Bush isn't Pat Buchanan or Jesse Helms. Bush repudiated Kyoto because the U.S. Senate indicated in July 1997 95–0 with five abstensions that it wouldn't ratify the treaty; even if all 5 Senators who abstained were closet Kyoto supporters, another 61 Senators would have to be found to ratify it. The Senate has indicated that it would not ratify the International Court of Justice under any forseeable circumstances, despite the previous administration's signature on the treaty.

On the other hand, Bush has promoted increased international cooperation where he has found Senate support, particularly in the area of trade; for example, in his efforts to expand the North American Free Trade Agreement to cover the entire western hemisphere (excluding Cuba), and his promotion of eliminating all tariffs on manufactured goods and sharply curtailing agricultural subsidies in the Doha round at the World Trade Organization. Even in the preparations for war with Iraq, Bush has sought the cooperation from friendly states, and has received it from a majority of the members of NATO and from a number of states in around the Gulf concerned about Iraq's potential threat to their region. None of these are the actions of a unilateralist president. And since Bush isn't a unilateralist, it's hard to believe he'd deliberately seek to undermine the authority of the United Nations — even though other member states, notably our nominal allies France and Germany, seem to be pursuing that end, by undermining the credibility of UNSC resolutions and the weapons inspections process rather than supporting the need for Iraqi compliance.

Steven Den Beste has had a good night's sleep and some e-mails and is significantly less pessimistic today, while Robert Jones is expecting some sort of procedural resolution from the U.N. that can be spun as a “second resolution” by fence-sitters along the lines of “option two” above.

First-time visitors: feel free to look around and see if there's other stuff you like.

Robert Jones says I misinterpreted what he meant about a second resolution; he says:

I was noodling more along a line of thought in which we present a second resolution which says, in diplomatic terms, "We've had enough. The war begins... now". The French and Germans would likely want to waffle and delay as long as possible, hoping to extend the issue out until the point is moot. However, as there can be no vetoing of procedural votes in the UNSC, we can move to terminate debate (which would be a procedural vote) and call for an immediate vote (of the substantive sort) on our resolution.

I'm not sure such a cloture vote is strictly necessary, although it would be politically unpalatable to start the bombing before the UNSC debate was concluded. That's still somewhere in the realm of “option two,” which is more a bunch of related options that all conclude in no substantive additional UNSC action and are more politically expedient than reinforcing of the UNSC's authority over international conflict under the U.N. Charter (“option one”) or further undermining the authority of the Security Council (”option three”).

After thinking some more, what Robert says is clearer to me: rather than as an end in and of itself, he views a procedural “cloture” vote as a step toward a conclusive vote on the substantive issue of whether or not to attack Iraq (the “second vote” the waverers want). “Option two” doesn't countenance a second vote, however, and I don't think the Bush administration really wants one — indeed, pursuing one would concede the Axis of Weasels position that one is needed. If there's a second resolution, it will be proposed by an Axis of Weasels power (probably Germany) in order to stop the U.S. from appearing to act without their blessing, not because the “coalition of the willing” genuinely cares about getting one.

While ScrappleFace reminds us of France's recent prediliction for multilateral solutions to world problems, John Cole points out that French unilateralism has a long, glorious history of its own.

In other Iraq-related news, Ipse Dixit argues that France and Germany, if they want the U.N. Security Council to remain a credible force, need to move off their anti-war position, but they've backed themselves into a corner with their increasingly hardline rhetoric.

The Blix Brigade has made their report to the U.N., and it makes it fairly clear that the Iraqi government isn't cooperating or being at all forthcoming. Paul Miller suggests that the evidence of mustard gas precursors found by the inspectors constitutes a material breach, while Steven Den Beste continues to ask the obvious question: if the inspections haven't worked so far, why does the Axis of Weasels think they ought to continue? OxBlog's David Adesnik argues that British Prime Minister Tony Blair is showing himself to be a statesman, taking up the mantle of Winston Churchill. Finally, Bill Whittle reminds us that we're already at war, even if the Iraqi phase hasn't started yet.

Ya know, if you're Hans Blix and you're trying to convince people that you're not just playing Quisling for the Iraqi regime, one of the first things you might want to try is protecting people who want to defect from their government, instead of handing them over to Iraqi security. Dear lord.

Michele, Charles Johnson, Glenn Reynolds, and Half-Bakered also comment.

The Economist takes on Josh Marshall's latest, er, talking points on North Korea (subscription required, natch). You don't need a subscription to read their fairly thorough debunking of the anti-Americanism is Bush's fault thesis, however.

For a more sensible take (well, than TPM's, at least) on the North Korea business, see David Adesnik's latest at OxBlog; on Iraq, Adesnik takes down the “Iraq=Oil” theory (”This time, the critical issue is that Saddam has mocked the authority of both the US and the UN for over a decade. We realized on Sept. 11 that this had to end.”) and Steven Den Beste's discussion of strategic versus tactical surprise is worth a read. And, for good measure, Bryan Preston takes down TPM.

Well, UPI reports that the Iraqis have already violated the most recent UN Security Council resolution. Maybe Saddam is bored with running Iraq and needs an exit strategy...