Will Baude explains the problem with the Court’s pseudo-jurisprudence on race and the Bill of Rights more generally:

Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided that separating prisoners on the basis of race, even for 60 days, ought to be subject to strict scrutiny (although it is as yet unclear whether they mean Adarand-strict or Grutter-strict). [emphasis mine]

This isn’t particularly surprising, since the Court rarely (never?) says racial classifications are subject to anything other than strict scrutiny—whatever the heck that means.

More in line with my pet peeves, readers are invited to comment on whether or not any standard of review other than “rational basis” (i.e. “we’re not going to do anything about it so long as the legislature or executive goes through the motions of justifying its action”)—heightened scrutiny, strict scrutiny, imminent lawless action, Lemon, whatever—is functionally equivalent to “we’ll strike it down if five of us are in the mood on that particular day.” For added Bonus Cool Points, pick any five cases where the court applied “strict scrutiny,” apply “heightened scrutiny,” and tell me if you get a different outcome in any of the cases.